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TAKINGS LAW AND THE REGULATORY 
STATE: A RESPONSE TO R.S. RADFORD* 
by William Michael Treanor** 
Introduction 
In the Winter 1994 issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, 
R.S. Radford provided an illuminating review of Dennis Coyle's 
book Property Rights and the Constitution.1 Radford observes that, 
in addition to studying post-New Deal land use cases, Coyle "pro-
vides an ideological framework that illuminates several key strands 
in the constitutional jurisprudence of property law ... [and] sets 
forth his own theories of the vital role of private property in creat-
ing and maintaining the American constitutional system."2 Rad-
ford's review is a generally enthusiastic one. He sees Coyle's book 
as providing a much-needed corrective to "the existing pro-regula-
tory bias in the [scholarly] literature. "3 He applauds Coyle, as well, 
for enriching our understanding of the competing preference sys-
tems that lead to different views about the legitimacy of land use 
regulation. 
Underlying Radford's review is the idea that property rights de-
serve greater constitutional protection than they have received in 
the almost sixty years since the Supreme Court accepted the funda-
mental legitimacy of the regulatory state. Radford's position in 
this regard is not novel, but reflects broader trends in the courts 
and in the academy. In particular, Professor Richard Epstein of 
the University of Chicago has argued that the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause should be interpreted to bar government actions 
with redistributive consequences-to bar, in other words, the mod-
* R.S. Radford, Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric: Broadening the Terms 
of Debate, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (1994) (reviewing DENNIS J. CoYLE, 
PRoPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CoNSTITUTioN: SHAPING SociETY THROUGH LAND UsE 
REGULATION (1993)). 
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ern regulatory state.4 At the same time, in a series of recent cases 
involving land use and the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court has 
expanded the scope of the Takings Clause, although its holdings 
have been narrower in scope than Epstein's view would warrant.5 
In this response, I will use Radford's review to talk about prop-
erty rights and the Constitution. First, I will review Radford's in-
terpretation and criticism of Coyle's theory. I will then discuss 
Radford's Culture X theory in the context of Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council. 6 Finally, I will discuss the constitutional im-
plications of Radford's analysis. 
Radford's Review of Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric 
In discussing Coyle's book, Radford writes that land use debates 
have typically been perceived as pitting "the private interests of 
property owners ... [against] the public interests of the state."7 In 
contrast, Coyle argues that these disputes should be understood 
"as a three-way opposition between competing preference systems 
embodying different fundamental values: liberty, equality and 
order."8 
Radford finds Coyle's approach helpful in understanding judicial 
rhetoric. But he faults Coyle for failing to consider whether people 
view land use regulation differently depending on whether the bur-
den of it falls on them. As Radford puts it: 
The relative cost to the evaluator of implementing these pref-
erence rankings inevitably alters the evaluation. Unfortunately, 
Coyle's grid-group preference model abstracts completely from 
the allocation and distribution of costs. Group identification 
and rule orientation are the only variables taken into account, 
and the model's output is taken to be uniform regardless of 
whether the resulting preferences are applied to oneself, to 
others, or to universal states.9 
4. Epstein's leading work on point is RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
5. See Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
6. 112 S. Ct. 2886. 
7. CoYLE, supra note 1, at 415. 
8. ld. 
9. ld. at 419. As Radford writes, according to Coyle, the values of liberty, equal-
ity and order arise: 
... from the interplay of two key dimensions of social orientation designated 
as group and grid. Group denotes the extent to which individuals define 
themselves as members of a collective such that personal interests are delib-
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According to Radford, because Coyle has failed to consider eco-
nomic cost, he has failed to see the impact on land use policy of a 
fourth worldview, which Radford calls "Culture X."10 Those 
whose worldview is a Culture X worldview "would be motivated 
mainly by personal self-interest, yet would support extensive social 
regulation and control over others. "11 
. Lucas and the Culture X Worldview 
Radford contends that the aftermath of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission12 indicates 
the powerful way in which the Culture X worldview shapes land 
use policy. In that case, the South Carolina Coastal Commission 
barred David Lucas from developing two vacant beachfront lots he 
owned.13 The United States Supreme Court held that, when a gov-
ernment regulation deprives property of all economic value, the 
government owes the owner compensation, unless the regulation 
was of a common l~w nuisance or was consistent with background 
principles of property law. The Court then remanded the case to 
determine whether one of the exceptions applied.14 On remand, 
the exceptions were. found not to apply, and South Carolina 
purchased Lucas's land.15 ·At that point, rather than leave the lots 
vacant, South Carolina put them up for sale for residential 
development. 
Thus, Radford contends, South Carolina was willing to impose 
on David Lucas the costs of a policy of preserving the beachfront, 
but was· not willing to assume that burden itself.16 ·According to 
Radford, the fact that South Caroiina's decision to sell the land did 
erately subordinated to the welfare of all. Grid refers to the degree to which 
individual actions and decisions are seen to be constrained by a network of 
social rules. · The resulting preference systems are plotted below: 
High Grid Low Grid 
High Group Hierarchical Egalitarian 
Low Group Culture X Libertarian 
ld. at 415-16 (citations omitted). 
10. Id. at 416. 
11. Id. 
12. 112 S. Ct. 2886. 
13. ld. at 420 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coa~tal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 
(1991)). 
14. 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
15. See id. at 421. 
16. Id. at 421-23. 
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not provoke a public outcry is attributable to the prevalence of the 
Culture X worldview. He writes: 
The pursuit of economic self-interest by seeking to impose regu-
latory burdens on others can plainly be attributed to a Culture X 
worldview. Since pro-regulatory rhetoric emanating from Cul-
ture X is not based on consistent principle or ideology, and 
there is little anticipated payoff in appealing to the state to regu-
late itself, these voices could be expected to fall mute when the 
State of South Carolina took over David Lucas's propertyP 
In his conclusion, Radford suggests that imposition of a compen-
sation requirement would beneficially alter the debates about land 
use by s~ripping from the adherents of Culture X their incentive to 
support regulation. Thus, he observes, "[i]f effective procedures 
can be found to require the beneficiaries of restrictive property 
regulations to bear the cost of such measures, a major advocacy 
group ... might disappear from the arena of land use disputes alto-
gether." He adds that this is "a happy prospect."18 
It would seem that Radford is suggesting that courts impose the 
requirement that beneficiaries pay for the benefits they receive. 
The alternative would be that majoritarian decisionmakers-Con-
gress or state legislatures-impose such a requirement. Theoreti-
cally, majoritarian decisionmakers might enact such a requirement. 
For example, the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, part 
of the Republican Contract with America, would mandate com-
pensation whenever a government regulation diminishes the value 
of property by 10% or by $10,000, whichever is less.19 
Given Radford's belief in the prevalence of the self-interested 
Culture X worldview, however, it is unlikely that he also believes 
that majoritarian decisionmakers are capable of such acts of self-
abnegation. Moreover, he clearly salutes the rise of judicial activ-
ism in the area of property rights. It seems, therefore, that he 
desires judicial action to impose the burden of regulation on those 
who benefit from it. 
Criticism of Radford's Culture X Worldview Theory 
Possibly, I am attributing to Radford a conception of the judicial 
role that he would not in fact endorse. But the conception is none-
17. /d. at 422. 
18. /d. at 423. 
19. See Environmentalists Detail Objections to GOP Proposed Contract with 
America, BNA DAILY REPT. FOR ExECUTIVES at A1 (Jan. 3, 1995) (discussing pro-
posed Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act). 
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theless an interesting one and consistent with increasing demands 
by conservatives for judicial activism in the property area. In this 
regard, the remainder of this piece will discuss whether it is good 
constitutional law. I will not address the issue of whether it would 
be legitimate constitutionally to impose the burden on the benefi-
ciaries. I will focus instead on the question of whether the property 
owners should have a judicially-enforced constitutional right to 
compensation when a Culture X worldview lies behind a 
regulation. 
The relevant constitutional text, if courts are to impose a com-
pensation requirement, is the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 
which reads: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. "20 
There is a critical threshold problem with using this text to re-
quire compensation for regulations: the language of the Clause 
doesn't apply to regulations at all. If we interpret the words in the 
way in which they are normally used, what this clause means is 
simply that when the government physically takes property and 
uses it for its own purposes, then it has to pay the former owner. 
For example, when the government takes someone's land for a post 
office, it has to pay her. Compensation would be owed because the 
land would be "taken for a public use." But when a government 
regulation lowers the value of property-even when it dramatically 
lowers the value-nothing is "taken for public use." 
Let's take Lucas as an example. The regulation may have made 
Lucas's land worthless, but it did not take the property for public 
use. The land still belonged to Lucas. Justice Scalia, it should be 
noted, disagrees with this argument about the plain meaning of the 
text. In Lucas, Scalia wrote that "the text of the Clause can be 
read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations 
•••• "
21 Any such reading departs from normal usage. A regula-
tion of property does not, however, take property for a public use. 
The words "taken" and "for a public use" reflect the idea of physi-
cal seizure. 
Moreover, to the extent that evidence exists, the original under-
standing of the Takings Clause and of its state counterparts was 
consistent with what I have argued is the clauses' plain meaning. 
The Takings Clause and similar state constitutional provisions were 
originally understood to apply only when the government physi-
cally took property. Regulations, no matter how drastically they 
20. U.S. CoNST. AMEND. V. 
21. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.15. 
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affected the price of property, did not trigger a compensation re-
quirement.22 Even Justice Scalia acknowledges that "early consti-
tutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced 
regulations of property at all."23 The larger point that should be 
made is that, as a general matter, the Framers did not believe that 
regulations that affected the value of property were impermissi-
ble.24 Thus, a requirement that beneficiaries have· to pay for 
regulations is not consistent with original understanding or consti-
tutional text because the text and the original understanding tell us 
that regulations never give rise to a compensation requirement. 
Of course, there is now precedent for reading the Takings Clause 
to require compensation for regulations, despite the text and origi-
nal understanding. In 1922, the Supreme Court decided in Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon25 that "if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."26 As it established this rule, however, the 
case also created a problem that has failed to yield a solution: how 
can courts tell when a regulation "goes too far"? Scholars and 
courts have long struggled with this problem and the inconsisten-
cies in the case law have occasioned frequent comments.27 At the 
same time, the precedent does not support the principle that courts 
should require compensation whenever they suspect that the ma-
jority would not impose a regulation if its beneficiaries had to pay 
for it. Although the principle that compensation is due when a reg-
ulation "goes too far" departs from the original understanding, it 
does not totally eliminate the concept that a certain degree of def-
erence is owed to majoritarian decisionmakers. A regulation that 
diminishes the value of property and that serves public purposes 
does not give rise to a compensation requirement so long as it does 
not go "too far." Moreover, takings law requires that the polity as 
a whole pay compensation, not simply those who benefit from a 
particular regulation. 
I have not discussed whether it would be wise from a public pol-
icy perspective to require beneficiaries to pay for their regulations. 
22. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,701-06 (1985). 
23. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.15. 
24. This point is developed in William Michael Treanor, The Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1995). 
25. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
26. /d. at 415. 
27. For an excellent discussion of the case law, see Andrea L. Petersen, The Tak-
ings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles (pts. 1 & 2), 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 
(1989), 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990). 
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But if we assume that it would be, there is still a fundamental prob-
lem with such a scheme. As suggested above, it lacks any constitu-
tional basis. The language and original understanding do not 
support it. Nor does precedent. All we are left with is the possible 
argument that land use decisions would be improved if courts im-
posed such a requirement. Unless we are to have government by 
judiciary, more of a basis than that is necessary to justify judicial 
invalidation of decisions arrived at by majoritarian decisionmakers. 
Conclusion 
In his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York,28 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote: 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics .... [A] constitution is not intended to em-
body a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and 
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. 
It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the 
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or 
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment 
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States.29 
Critiques of economic regulation have gotten more sophisticated in 
the past ninety years, but Holmes's core insight remains accurate. 
A regulation can be economically unsound without being unconsti-
tutional. In a constitutional system in which the power of courts to 
invalidate majoritarian decisionmaking is limited, the difference 
between economic regulations that are unsound and those that are 
unconstitutional is critical. 
28. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
29. ld. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
